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NOTES
SPEEDY TRIALS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONCERNING A VITAL RIGHT
I. Introduction
Historically, Anglo-American law has jealously guarded the right
of an accused to have a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution.,
Englishmen formally claimed the right in the Magna Charta of
1215.2 In the United States, it is extended to defendants in. federal
cases by the sixth amendment to the Constitution.' Through incor-
poration into the fourteenth amendment, the protection is likewise
available to defendants in state prosecutions.'
Notwithstanding constitutional provisions and Supreme Court
decisions, the concept of a speedy trial in the United States has
always been ambiguous. Until recent times it has been considered
a matter that could only be defined in the context of the special
circumstances of individual cases.5 The right was said to be "consis-
tent with delays"; 6 thus there has been less than an absolute guar-
antee that a defendant would be tried within a short time of his
arrest or indictment.
Society has several vital interests in securing speedy trials in
criminal prosecutions. This Note will discuss those interests and
examine two plans which represent attempts to give exact definition
to the right. One plan was made effective in 1971 by the Judicial
1. United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 196 (D.C. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 857
(1955).
2. "We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right."
MAGNA CHARA ch. 40 (1215).
3. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial .. " U.S. CONST. amend VI.
4. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967).
5. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1972).
6. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
7. 2D CIR. R. 1-9 (PROMPT DISPOSITION OF CRIM. CAS.) [hereinafter cited as 2D CIR. R.].
These rules are reprinted in 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1976). Though district courts were mandated
to enact their own rules regarding the prompt disposition of criminal cases after the promul-
gation of Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective October 1,' 1972),
several courts in the Second Circuit modeled their plans upon the Second Circuit rules.
Outstanding among these courts, were the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York from
where many cases discussed in this Note arose. See text accompanying notes 37-104 infra.
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Council for the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Ap-
peals.7 The other, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974,1 is the product of
congressional action. By 1979, after a five year break-in period, this
Act must be given full effect in all federal courts.
II. Societal Interests in Speedy Trials
The right to a speedy trial is commonly thought to be a right of
an accused, but it actually benefits society as a whole and not just
individual defendants.' In Barker v. Wingo, 0 the Supreme Court of
the United States declared:"
[Tihere is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which exists sepa-
rate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused.
Ideally, a defendant in a criminal case benefits from a speedy trial
in several ways. The practice prevents undue and oppressive incar-
ceration prior to trial. It reduces the time that an accused may suffer
from personal anxiety and public suspicion. Also, it minimizes the
chances that defenses will be prejudiced because of the disappear-
ance of witnesses or the fading of memories over time.'" On the
whole, the right enhances the integrity and fairness of an entire
criminal proceeding. 3
Frequently, however, accused persons may consider the above
benefits to be of no real importance to them. Prosecutors often
witness situations where defendants prefer delayed rather than
speedy trials and only become interested in the right when there is
a chance that by invoking it they can have their charges dismissed."
There is a great likelihood that defendants who are out on bail and
anticipate that they will be found guilty, will wish to avoid custody
as long as possible. 5 Aware that convictions are more easily ob-
tained when trials are held shortly after the commission of a crime,
a defendant may try to scuttle a successful prosecution through
delaying tactics. 6
8. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161-74 (Supp. 1976).
9. FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(b), Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules.
10. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
11. Id. at 519..
12. See United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120 (1966).
13. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 43 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring opinion).
14. Address by Whitney North Seymour, Jr., ABA Convention, Aug. 15, 1972, reprinted
in 118 CONG. RFc. 30404 (1972).
15. Id.
16. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
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A defendant in a criminal case can achieve definite advantages
through delay. Once trial starts, stale cases are more easily chal-
lenged by defense attorneys on cross examination.17 Juries are often
disenchanted with offenses that have occurred in the remote past. 8
If prosecution witnesses become unavailable over long periods of
time or prosecutorial ardor should wane, the guilty benefit at so-
ciety's expense. 9
Aside from affecting the probabilities of obtaining a conviction,
the speedy trial right has significant impacts upon the quality of
judicial action and the possibilities of future criminal conduct. The
tendency to postpone trials adds to court congestion and the backlog
of cases. To dispose of such backlog, plea bargaining is frequently
utilized."0 In the interest of expediting matters accused persons re-
ceive lighter sentences than those they actually may have deserved.
A second impact of delay is to weaken the deterrent effect that the
criminal justice system should have on would-be criminals.2'
Finally, the speedy trial right is intricately related to the needs
of a well ordered society in several other respects.22 Guilty persons
released on bail for too long tend to commit other crimes or flee the
jurisdiction of the courts altogether.23 Defendants who are not bailed
must spend "dead" time in local jails exposed to conditions destruc-
tive of human character.24 For those who are eventually found
innocent, their potential to be contributing members of society
through any kind of employment is lost during pre-trial incarcera-
tion. 5 On the other hand, the possibility of rehabilitating those who
are eventually found guilty is diminished since correction proce-
dures cannot be started until after trial." These non-productive
conditions are achieved at a great financial expense to society.2 The
17. Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1957).
18. See id.
19. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 264 (1922).
20. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).
21. Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929, 932 (1970).
22. Note, supra note 17.
23. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520 (1972).
24. Hearings on Federal Bail Procedures before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judi-
cial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 46 (1964) (testi-
mony of James V. Bennett, Director, Bureau of Prisons).
25. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972).
26. See id. at 520.
27. Id.
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enactment of plans for the prompt disposition of criminal cases was
aimed, in part, at their elimination.
III. The Second Circuit Plan
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, influential groups and individ-
ual persons gave serious consideration to the problem of delayed
criminal trials."' Various recommendations were forthcoming and
many of these pointed out a need for imposing definite time limits
upon courts and prosecutors for the completion of various stages in
criminal proceedings. Despite these proposals, the Supreme Court
refused to hold that the sixth amendment required that a defendant
in a criminal case be offered for trial within a specified time." In-
stead, it adopted a less precise "balancing test"3 to determine what
constituted a speedy trial. The Court explained this action by refer-
ring to its hesitancy to engage in what it considered to be legislative
activity.'
The Judicial Council for the Second Circuit of the United States
Court of Appeals did not share the reluctance of the Supreme Court.
In 1971, pursuant to its statutory power,3" it enacted a set of speedy
trial rules which more precisely delineated the right to a speedy
trial.33 As the first attempt to impose time limits in criminal trials,
the rules did not immediately end all mystery surrounding the
speedy trial right.34 Judicial reaction to and interpretation of the
rules was required. The issues most frequently litigated concerned
the meanings of Rules 4, 5, and 6.11
28. See, e.g., ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards Relating
to Speedy Trial (1967); PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967); Burger, The State of the Judici-
ary-1970, 56 A.B.A.J. 929 (1970); Address by President Nixon to the National Conference
on the Judiciary, March, 1971.
29. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 523 (1972).
30. Id. at 530. The four factors that must be balanced are: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reason for delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his sixth amendment right; (4) the existence
of prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.
31. Id. at 523.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1970).
33. 2D CIR. R. 1-9.
34. After the promulgation of the Second Circuit's rules, the test announced by the Su-
preme Court in Barker, see note 30 supra, still applied whenever a defendant specifically
claimed a violation of his sixth amendment right. Also, the Second Circuit's rules were not
binding on state courts within the circuit. For a discussion of New York State law concerning
the speedy trial right, see People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y.2d 271 (1975).




Rule 4 of the Second Circuit's plan was directed toward the prob-
lem of prosecutorial delay. Sometimes referred to as the "ready
rule"3 it mandated that the government be prepared for trial:37
[W]ithin six months from the date of the arrest, service of summons, deten-
tion, or the filing of a complaint or of a formal charge upon which the defen-
dant is to be tried (other than a sealed indictment), whichever is earliest.
To satisfy its obligation under the rule, the government had to
''communicate its readiness for trial to the court in some fashion
... '3 No presumption of readiness would be raised from the fact
that the government had sought an indictment since the sufficiency
of evidence to warrant the indictment could be less than what was
necessary for trial.3" In United States v. Pierro," the court recom-
mended that filing a written notice with the clerk of the court would
be the best advisable procedure to follow." Moreover, the 180 day
limitation on filing a notice was considered analogous to a statute
of limitations and thus was strictly enforced. Therefore, an unwar-
ranted delay of even one day beyond the period would not be consid-
ered de minimis."
Proper compliance with the rule allowed filing of notice only after
a defendant had pleaded innocent so that issue could be joined. This
meant that an indictment had to be procured well enough in ad-
vance to allow the defendant to plead and still permit the govern-
ment time to meet its deadline. 3 The sanction which the govern-
ment faced under the rule for failure to do so was dismissal of all
charges against the defendant."
Two significant cases had treated the problem of whether the
government could re-indict a defendant upon identical charges if a
of New York. See text accompanying notes 37-104 infra. These districts based their own
speedy trial rules upon the Second Circuit rules after the promulgation of Rule 50(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1972.
36. S. REP. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1974).
37. 2D CIR. R. 4.
38. United States v. Pierro, 478 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1973).
39. United States v. Scafo, 480 F.2d 1312, 1318 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1012
(1973).
40. 478 F.2d 386 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. Id. at 389.
42. United States v. McDonough, 504 F.2d 67, 68-69 (2d Cir. 1974).
43. United States v. Bowman, 493 F.2d 594, 596-97 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Valot,
481 F.2d 22, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1973).
44. 2D CIR. R. 4.
1976]
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prior indictment was dismissed for violation of Rule 4. In Hilbert v.
Dooling,45 the petitioner was arrested on August 5, 1971 for posses-
sion of illegal drugs. On February 3, 1972-just two days before the
six month period prescribed by the rule expired-he was indicted.
One month later the government filed its notice of readiness for
trial. The petitioner's motion to dismiss the charges was granted.4"
On May 30, 1972 a grand jury then handed down a superseding
indictment charging the same offense. The district court denied a
new defense motion to'dismiss the second indictment. The peti-
tioner sought a mandamus from the court of appeals and it was
granted."
In ordering the district court to dismiss the second indictment the
appellate court said that to let it stand would render the rules a
"dead letter."48 It interpreted the use of such words as "must,"
"shall," and "charge" contained in Rule 4 as requiring the dismissal
to be with prejudice."
In accord with the decision in Hilbert, the court in United States
v. Bosques9 dismissed a charge and forbade re-indictment when the
government failed to give its timely notice required by the rule.
B. Rule 5
To insure fairness to the government, Rule 5 provided that the
running of the clock could be tolled for a variety of reasons.' Delays
caused by the defendant or in the defendant's behalf were not com-
puted within the time limit that the government had to be ready
for trial. If, for example, a defendant was unavailable for trial," or
without counsel,5" or joined with a co-defendant as to whom the time
for trial had not run,54 periods of delay were tolerated.
Prosecutions could also be delayed if a societal interest, greater
than those interests protected by the speedy trial right, was being
served:"
45. 476 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
46. Id. at 356.
47. Id. at 357.
48. Id. at 358.
49. Id.
50. 364 F. Supp. 131, 134 (D. Conn. 1973).
51. 2D CIR. R. 5.
52. 2D CIR. R. 5(b).
53. 2D CIR. R. 5(g).
54. 2D CIR. R. 5(e).
55. United States v. Pierro, 478 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1973).
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NOTES
The Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases
were not intended to straightjacket the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts, nor were they designed to place obstacles in the path of
legitimate law enforcement efforts ....
Thus, in United States v. Rollins,"6 the government was allowed to
delay a defendant's trial until it finished an investigation of the
police officer who arrested him. The court excused the prosecutor's
unpreparedness by stating that the public interest in fighting police
corruption outweighed the benefits of a speedy trial. 7 Protecting an
undercover policeman's identity was likewise considered a sufficient
reason to postpone a trial.58
Under Rule 5(h) the clock could also be tolled during periods of
delay "occasioned by exceptional circumstances."59 The meaning of
this clause was at first a matter of considerable controversy. Viewed
liberally the clause could have allowed the government to escape the
restrictions of Rule 4. The courts in their decisions, however, opted
for a strict construction.
In several cases a factual situation had arisen where the govern-
ment was not ready for trial due to internal disorders in the offices
of the United States Attorneys. In United States v. Pollak,10 the
court suggested that an "extraordinary situation in the office of the
prosecutor" could justify reasonable delay." Later cases eventually
decided that understaffed conditions" and turnovers in personnel 3
did not qualify as exceptional conditions. Rule 5(h) was then said
to cover only unusual occasions that the drafters of the rules could
not envision or could not have been aware of. 4
C. Rule 6
Even if no Rule 5 allowance of delay applied and Rule 4 had been
complied with to the fullest, a defendant was not actually guaran-
teed trial within six months of arrest or indictment under the Sec-
56. 487 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1973).
57. Id. at 414.
58. United States v. Cuomo, 479 F.2d 688, 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002
(1973).
59. 2D CIR. R. 5(h).
60. 474 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973).
61. Id. at 830.
62. United States v. Bowman, 493 F.2d 594, 597 (2d Cir. 1974).
63. United States v. Favaloro, 493 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 625.
1976]
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ond Circuit plan.5 The responsibility for scheduling cases rested
with the courts which remained in control of their own trial calen-
dars. The rules merely commanded that priority be given to the
scheduling of criminal cases "[ilnsofar as is practicable.""6 Cases
that considered the problem of court congestion resulting in delays
suggested that congestion was an excusable event67 and beyond the
compass of the rules to punish."Rule 6, dealing with all appellate court ordered initial trials and
retrials, eventually provided a solution for part of the problem."9
Several decisions interpreting the rule, as carried over into Southern
and Eastern District Court plans,7 0 suggested that delay traced to
the courts could result in a dismissal of all charges against a defen-
dant. In United States v. Drummond7 the appellant had been con-
victed of conspiring to sell heroin but the conviction was set aside
due to prosecutorial misconduct.72 A new trial order was handed
down on July 5, 1973 but it did not issue until September 14, 1973.11
At that time, the judge assigned to hear the new trial began another
difficult criminal case that precluded him from scheduling the ap-
pellant's case. In April, 1974, a motion to dismiss was denied.74
In May the case was reassigned to a different judge and trial
began on July 11, 1974.11 The appellant was again convicted. A new
appeal, based on the alleged violation of Rule 6 of the Eastern
District's plan,7" was unsuccessful and the conviction was affirmed.77
The court of appeals pointed out that Rule 6 had nothing to do with
65. Hilbert v. Dooling, 476 F.2d 355, 357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
66. 2D CIR. R; 1.
67. See United States v. Counts, 471 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935
(1973).
68. See United States v. Infanti, 474 F.2d 522, 528 (2d Cir. 1973).
69. 2D CIR. R. 6. If the defendant is to be retried following a mistrial, an order for a new
trial, or an appeal or collateral attack, the time shall run from the date when the order
occasioning the retrial becomes final. Id.
70. E.D.N.Y. (Crim.) R. 6, N.Y. COURT RULES: STATE AND FEDERAL (McKinney 1975);
S.D.N.Y. (Crim.) R. 6, N.Y. CoURT RULES: STATE AND FEDERAL (McKinney 1975).
71. 511 F.2d 1049 (2d Cir. 1975).
72. United States v. Drummond, 481 F.2d 62, 64 (2d Cir. 1973).
73. - 511 F.2d at 1051.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. The only major distinction between the Eastern District court version and the older
Rule 6 rested in the fact that appellate court orders had to be obeyed within 90 days instead
of six months.
77. 511 F.2d at 1055.
358 [Vol. IV
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the issue of prosecutorial readiness. 8 It noted the long interval of
time in issuing the retrial order and the delay in reassigning the case
as the reasons for the violation of the rule. 9 The court excused the
violation but warned that judicial negligence would not be tolerated
in the future. It admonished that "[b]oth the United States Attor-
ney and the judge to whom a retrial is assigned should closely moni-
tor its progress."' "
United States v. Roemer8' was decided on April 8, 1975. Appellant
had been indicted on February 25, 1970 but the government delayed
trial in an attempt to extradite a co-conspirator. The district court
considered this delay unreasonable and dismissed the indictment.2
The government then was granted a writ of mandamus ordering the
court to reinstate the indictment. The district court postponed the
trial when the Supreme Court was asked to review the mandamus
order. 4 Certiorari was eventually denied,85 but this fact was not
promptly brought to the attention of the trial judge.88 A delay of
several months resulted and the actual trial did not begin until
October 29, 1974.87
When the appellant contested his conviction on the grounds that
Rule 6 of the Southern District's plan had been violated,8 the court
of appeals affirmed the lower court decision. In its opinion, the
court reviewed the purpose and effect of the speedy trial rules. It
stated that the rules were "'not established primarily to safeguard
defendants' rights . . .[but instead] to serve public interest in the
prompt adjudication of criminal cases.' ,0 The court then found
that negligence in the office of the trial judge was a cause of pro-
78. Id. at 1051-52.
79. Id. at 1054.
80. Id.
81. 514 F.2d 1377 (2d Cir. 1975).
82. Id. at 1379.
83. United States v. Lasker, 481 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
84. 514 F.2d at 1379.
85. Lasker v. United States, 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
86. 514 F.2d at 1379.
87. Id. at 1380.
88. The only major distinction between the Southern District court version and the older
Rule 6 rested in the fact that appellate court orders'had to be obeyed within 90 days instead
of six months.
89. 514 F.2d at 1384.
90. Id. at 1381, quoting United States v. Flores, 501 F.2d 1356, 1360 n.4 (2d Cir. 1974).
1976]
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longed delay.' It felt that to punish this negligence by reversing the
appellant's conviction would disserve the public interest more than
ignoring the oversight." The court, however, viewed the situation
with "serious concern at the sluggishness with which justice was
finally achieved .. . ."" It warned courts and prosecutors alike
that the failure to "flag the time requirements in all criminal cases"
would not be treated lightly in the future."4
Together, the-Drummond and Roemer cases influenced the recent
decision in United States v. Didier15 There, a Southern District
court judge refused relief to a defendant when the government failed
to prosecute its case within 90 days after the declaration of a
mistrial as mandated by Rule 6 of the district's plan. 6 The court
excused the government's failure by saying that it was due to con-
fusion over the meaning of Rule 6. Since the rule was unclear until
the courts explained it in Drummond and Roemer, the delay in
bringing the defendant to trial would not be counted against the
government."7
Also consistent with the warnings issued in Drummond and
Roemer, is a recent case dismissed by a district court when delay
in bringing a retrial was traced to the conduct of the court itself. 8
In this instance the defendant was arrested on May 21, 1973. He
was convicted on March 8, 1974,11 but the conviction was reversed
and a new trial was ordered. '0
The mandamus for retrial was filed on December 16, 1974. Defen-
dant's trial should have taken place no later than March 17, 1975 if
Rule 6 was to be properly observed,' 1 but the judge who heard the
first trial waited until May 1975 to initiate'the reassignment of the
91. 514 F.2d at 1381.
92. Id.
93.- Id. at 1382.
94. Id.
95. 401 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
96. Id. at 8.
97. Id.
98. United States v. Yagid, Crim. No. 73-471 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1975), aff'd, No. 75-1288
(2d Cir., Jan. 5, 1976).
99. Id. atl.
100. United States v. Badalamente, 507 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
911 (1975).
101. United States v. Yagid, Crim. No. 73-471 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 1975), aff'd, No. 75-1288
(2d Cir., Jan. 5, 1976).
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case." 2 The reassignment became a matter of record on June 4, 1975
and in July the defendant moved for a dismissal."3 The court
granted this motion stating that it could not "imagine a situation
more clearly in violation" of the Rule."4
In light of the overall history of the rules, the Second Circuit plan
was not the perfect solution to the problem of delayed criminal
trials. Rule 4 was aimed at eliminating prosecutorial delay. Even
then, it allowed the government six months to be ready for trial. As
a result, defendants were often not speedily tried. Rule 5 was neces-
sary to protect the interests of justice in particular cases, but it
primarily operated to legitimize delay. Rule 6 was the single poten-
tially effective rule against court created dealy, but it dealt solely
with the narrow subject of court of appeal ordered trials and retrials.
IV. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974
Ever since the 88th Congress, speedy trial legislation of some sort
had been under consideration by Congress.' 0 In mid-1970 a bill was
introduced into the Senate which, over the course of four years,
evolved into the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. '06 The initial phases of
this act were given effect on July 1, 1975.07 It is scheduled to be fully
operational in the federal courts by July, 1979.
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Id. at 9.
105. S. REP. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974).
106. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified at 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 3161-74 (Supp. 1976)). S. 3936 was introduced in the record session of the 91st
Congress. Title II of S. 3936 received unfavorable comments and was severed from the bill.
S. 895 introduced in the first session of the 92d Congress was virtually identical to the part
'of S. 3936 which remained. See Hearings on S. 895 before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 2 (1971). S. 754 was the
successor of S. 3936 and S. 895. It was passed into law as the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.
107. In compliance with the first mandated procedures of the Act, district courts had to
develop interim plans within 90 days of July 1, 1975, which would contain certain basic
provisions. For example, "high risk" defendants and those incarcerated while awaiting trial
had to be tried within 90 days following their designation as being "high risk" or the beginning
of continuous detention. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3164 (Supp. 1976). This is a stricter requirement than
anything contained either in the Second Circuit plan or the district court versions of speedy
trial rules that were based upon it. See 2D Cm. R. 1(b), 3; E.D.N.Y. (Crim.) R. 1(b), 3 N.Y.
COURT RULES STATE AND FEDERAL (McKinney 1975); S.D.N.Y. (Crim.) R. 1(b), 3, N.Y. COuRT
RULES STATE AND FEDERAL (McKinney 1975). Also, the time limits provided in 18 U.S.C.A. §
3161(e) were meant to be immediately applicable. See Comm. on the Administration of the
Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference, Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974, at 10 (1975).
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In passing the Act, Congress desired to define standards for what
constitutes a speedy trial.' Experiences with previous attempts to
do the same had not proved satisfactory. The Barker v. Wingo
test,' " enunciated in 1972 by the Supreme Court, was said to pro-
vide no real guidance to either defendants, courts, or prosecutors.
It was found to be a neutral test at best which reinforced the legiti-
macy of delay."'
Many district court plans passed in 1973 pursuant to Rule 50(b)
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, simply did not provide
for speedy trials."' Moreover, no uniform statement of a defendant's
rights had resulted from these plans. Each district court was al-
lowed to inaugurate a policy of its own choosing and this led to
discrepancies within many states as well as the nation. For example,
if a defendant committed a crime in the'Southern District of Geor-'
gia, he would be entitled to a trial within 45 days of his arraignment.
In the Middle District, however, there was a 90 day period, and in
the Northern District, his trial need commence only within 180 days
of arraignment."'
The legislators likewise concluded that the Second Circuit plan
did not efficiently deal with all the problems of delayed trials.,
They recognized its value as an initial attempt to cure the situation
but they desired a more complete set of guidelines that would man-
date even more speedier trials. Thus, the most basic changes incor-
porated into the new law related to the actual time periods within
which trials had to be held.
Rule 4 established a "ready rule" which compelled the prosecu-
tors to notify the court of their readiness for trial within six months
of a defendant's arrest."' While there was no precise deadline for
obtaining an indictment or filing an information, this had to be done
well enough in advance to allow the defendant to plead and still
permit the government time to meet its deadline. Trial was not
actually guaranteed to take place shortly thereafter. Unlike Rule 4,
108. H.R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
109. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). For statement of the test, see note 30
supra.
110. H. R. REP. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974).
111. Id. at 13.
112. Id.
113. 119 CONG. REC. 3264 (1973) (remarks Senator Ervin).
114. 2D Cm. R. 4.
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the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 distinguishes three stages in a criminal
prosecution and mandates that each stage be reached within certain
specific periods. The courts as well as the prosecutors are bound by
these limitations."15
A. Filing of Information or Indictment
Section 3161(b) provides:" 6
Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission
of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such
individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such
charges.
This section sharply reduces the time that was alloted under the
Second Circuit's Rule 4, making it necessary to call a grand jury and
have it return an indictment within thirty days.
Throughout the nation, the enactment of this statute may require
changes in several current practices. Local districts will no longer
be afforded the luxury of calling a grand jury only when there is
enough business to put before it. Problems may arise in some dis-
tricts when a person is arrested on or near the last meeting of a
particular grand jury session. These can easily be averted if a suc-
cessor grand jury is sworn in before its predecessor is discharged. If
a prosecutor should present a complex case to a grand jury and need
more time to complete it than is alloted under this section, a reason-
able additional time will be permitted."7
B. Arraignment and Trial
Section 3161(c) provides:" 8
The arraignment of a defendant charged in an information or indictment
with the commission of an offense shall be held within ten days from the
filing date . . . . Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial
of the defendant shall commence within sixty days from the arraignment on
the information or indictment ....
This section contains two important safeguards. It establishes the
general rule that an arraignment of the defendant will be held
115. See 119 CONG. REC. 3264 (1973) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
116. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b) (Supp. 1976).
117. Comm. on the Administration of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference,
Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, at 4-5 (1975).
118. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(c) (Supp. 1976).
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within a short time of the filing of an indictment or information. It
also requires that a person be tried within 60 days thereafter. Unlike
the Second Circuit's plan, the courts will be held strictly accounta-
ble for scheduling trials within this period."' Moreover, the periods
set out in the new law are more definitive than any contained in the
earlier plan.
As was the case with the Second Circuit rules, certain defined
circumstances will toll the running of the trial clock under the new
law. Section 3161(h) 2° contains provisions that in some instances
closely resemble those of Rule 5. 1
Specifically, both section 3161(h)(1) 2  and Rule 5(a)2 3 excuse
delay while other proceedings concerning the defendant are in prog-
ress. The new law as well as the old rule mention competency hear-
ings, "' 4 determinations of interlocutory appeals 5 and pre-trial mo-
tions ' as common examples of such proceedings.
Rules 5(b)'I and 5(c) 2 addressed themselves to the subject of
court ordered continuances. The Speedy Trial Act sets out addi-
tional factors that a court should consider before deciding whether
or not to grant a continuance.' These include: whether the failure
to grant the continuance would make continuation of the proceeding
impossible, or would result in a miscarriage of justice; 30 and
whether the case is complex.' No continuance can be granted sim-
ply because of the existence of court congestion.'32
Section 3161(h)(3)(A) 33 follows Rule 5(d)34 which excluded from
consideration any periods of time during which a defendant was
119. See 119 CONG. REC. 3264 (1973) (remarks of Senator Ervin).
120. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h) (Supp. 1976).
121. 2n CIR. R. 5.
122. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(1) (Supp. 1976).
123. 2D Cm. R. 5(a).
124. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(1)(A) (Supp. 1976).
125. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
126. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(E).
127. 2D Cm. R. 5(b).
128. 2D Cm. R. 5(c).
129. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(8) (Supp. 1976).
130. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i).
131. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii).
132. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(C).
133. Id, § 3161(h)(3)(A).
134. 2D Cm. R. 5(d).
unavailable for trial. Under section 3161(h)(3)(B), a defendant is
absent for trial:
[Wihen his whereabouts are unknown and, in addition, he is attempting to
avoid apprehension or prosecution or his whereabouts cannot be determined
by due diligence. For purposes of such subparagraph, a defendant . . shall
be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his pres-
ence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he resists appearing at
or being returned for trial.
Delay resulting from the absence of an essential witness is also
excluded from consideration under section 3161(h)(3)(A).' 36 While
the Second Circuit Rules did not specifically excuse delay when
witnesses were unavailable, one court stated that Rule 5(c)(ii) cov-
ered the situation adequately.'37 That Rule allowed a continuance
to be granted when the government needed "additional time to
prepare" and "exceptional circumstances" were present. Also, Rule
5(c)(i) allowed continuances due to the:'39
[U]navailability of evidence material to the government's case, when the
prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and
there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence will become avail-
able within a reasonable period ....
Rule 5(e) stated that delay would be permitted during a reason-
able period "when the defendant is joined for trial with a codefend-
ant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good cause
for not granting a severance."'' Section 3161(h)(7) substantially
follows this language."' In the new law there is no explicit equiva-
lent to Rule 5(h), which excluded "[o]ther periods of delay occa-
sioned by exceptional circumstances."'4 2
The section of the new law which is most nearly similar to Rule 6
of the Second Circuit's plan is section 3161(e). First, this section
allows 60 days for a trial to begin after the declaration of a mistrial
or an order for a new trial by a trial judge. It then mandates that a
135. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(3)(B) (Supp. 1976).
136. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(3)(A) (Supp. 1976).
137. United States v. Cuomo, 479 F.2d 688, 694 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1002
(1973).
138. 2D CIR. R. 5(c)(ii).
139. 2D CIR. R. 5(c)(i).
140. 2D CIR. R. 5(e).
141. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(h)(7) (Supp. 1976).
142. 2D Cm. R. 5(h).
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trial following an appeal or a collateral attack must commence
within 60 days from the date the action occasioning the retrial be-
comes final.' Rule 6 had allowed a six month retrial period in all
cases. 4' Now, only if witnesses should become unavailable or a 60
day retrial becomes impractical for some "other factors," may a
court allow six months at the utmost to pass before the retrial is
started." ' The "other factors" would apparently be those mentioned
in section 3161(h).146
If the time limits of the new law are exceeded and the delay is not
excusable, section 3162 provides for sanctions.'47 Dismissal of a
charge was the only penalty a court could impose under the Second
Circuit's rules." 8 The new law gives judges certain options. A court
can dismiss a case with or without prejudice. In making its decision,
it must consider: (1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) the facts and
circumstances of the case which led to dismissal; and (3) the impact
of a reprosecution on the administration of justice.'
Sanctions may also be imposed against attorneys who knowingly
or willfully fail to proceed expeditiously to trial or engage in unjusti-
fiable delaying tactics. 1'0 The attorney may be fined '"' or reported
to an appropriate disciplinary committee.' If he is appointed by
the court his compensation may be reduced. 3 Prosecutors as well
as defense attorneys are subject to these penalties when applicable.
The new law appears to be an improvement over previous plans.
In many ways it follows the pattern of the Second Circuit plan and
yet it is more refined than that early attempt to define the speedy
trial right. It mandates shorter and more specific time periods in
which certain stages in criminal prosecutions must be completed.
It makes allowances for circumstances that require special regula-
tion. It sets out more exacting guidelines for judges to follow in their
143. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(e) (Supp. 1976).
144. 2D CiR. R. 6.
145. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(e) (Supp. 1976).
146. Comm. on the Administration of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference,
Guidelines to the Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, at 9 (1975).
147. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3162 (Supp. 1976).
148. 2D CR. R. 4.
149. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3162(a)(1), (2) (Supp. 1976).
150. Id. § 3162(b).
151. Id. § 3162(b)(4)(B), (C).
152. Id. § 3162(b)(4)(E).
153. Id. § 3162(b)(4)(A).
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deliberations concerning the prompt disposition of criminal cases.
The new law addresses itself to prosecutors, courts and even defense
attorneys.
V. Conclusion
The speedy trial right is an important concept in American law
and in view of its past treatment by the courts, it necessarily should
be protected by special legislation. Thus far, judicially inspired
plans have not coped successfully with the problem of delayed
trials. Perhaps they never would be able to do so in the future since
this would require a great amount of self-policing activity. At any
rate, the proper role of the courts is not a legislative one and it is
fitting that Congress participate in effecting constitutional protec-
tions.
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 represents a well studied attempt
to safeguard the vitality of the sixth amendment right. In spite of
this, and even though the Act will not be fully effective until 1979,
definite problems attend its implementation. Initially, planning
groups may face difficulties in changing court practices and substi-
tuting interim plans. In the final analysis, a commitment to the
concept will be required of all courts and attorneys. Only where such
a commitment exists may the time limitations involved in the new
law be viewed as not impracticable.
Experience under the Southern District rules shows that the rate
of disposition of cases can increasewhen speedy trials are had.' 4 Not
only do the innocent benefit, but the rate of convictions and guilty
pleas increases as well.'55 If the purpose of the speedy trial right is
to benefit society, and justice delayed is justice denied, the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974 should indeed be welcome.
Stephen F. Chepiga
154. S. REP. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1974).
155. Id.
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